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The Name Game: Issues Surrounding New York
State's HIV Partner Notification Law

INTRODUCTION

On July 7, 1998, New York State passed a new HIV Partner
Notification Law.' This law, which requires doctors and healthcare
professionals to report the names of HIV 2 positive patients to the state

department of health for the purpose of notifying past sex partners or
drug needle sharers, has been the focus of immense controversy.3 In
this note I will discuss the matters of law and ethics that are raised by
this new law and address whether it4 is actually a threat to the human
rights of those that are HIV positive.

This law has two components that are equally controversial:
name reporting and contact tracing.5 "Name reporting" refers to the
practice of reporting the names of HIV positive individuals to local
health authorities. 6 "Contact tracing" is identifying those who have
been exposed to infection for the purpose of notifying them about the

I See S. 4422-B, 221st Leg., 1998 N.Y. Laws 584.
2 See Office of Communications and Public Liaison, Nat'l Inst. of Health,
Fact Sheet: The Evidence that HIV Causes AIDS (visited April 6, 2000)
<http://www.niad.nih.gov/factsheets/evidhiv.htm> [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. HIV is the
abbreviation for the Human Immunodeficiency virus, which causes the acquired immune
deficiency syndrome, more commonly known as AIDS. Id. HIV damages the immune
system and ruins the human body's ability to battle infections and some forms of cancer.
Id., See also Laurence Lavin, AIDS, Medicaid, and Women, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 193, 194 (1998).
3 See Tom Precious, Bill Requires Sex Partners to be Told of HIV Threat,
BUFFALO NEWS, June 20, 1998, at 1C (reporting on the vocal opposition to the law); see
also Al Baker, HIV Reporting Bill: Assembly Expected to Pass Measure, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
June 19, 1998, at A7 (explaining the arguments of the opposing factions).
4 See discussion infra Part III.A.
5 See S. 4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, §§ 2130 & 2133, 1998 N.Y. Laws 584 -85
(codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2130 & 2133 (McKinney Supp. 1999))
(describing the duty to report incidents of HIV infection and guidelines for contact
tracing).
6 See Chandler Burr, The AIDS Exception: Privacy vs. Public Health,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
2 (June 1997) (visited Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.theatlantic.
com/issues/97jun/burr.htm> (explaining the traditional public health methods used to
control infectious disease).
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risk to their health.7 In the first part of this note, I will look generally
at the history of name reporting and contact tracing as a U.S. public
health practice, and specifically, as a strategy for controlling the
spread of AIDS. I analyze the reasoning behind New York State's
original policy of strict confidentiality concerning AIDS 8 and I
examine the campaign to alter this policy. 9
In the second part of this note, I set forth a brief analysis of the
text and objectives of the Partner Notification Law and discuss
whether its wording is adequate to accomplish its stated objectives.' 0
In the final section, I analyze the possible societal impact of the
Partner Notification Law and discuss how, or if, it attempts to balance
a patient's right to privacy against the broader public issues of the
spread of HIV and AIDS." I also discuss the possible negative public
health consequences of partner notification. 12 In my conclusion I
attempt to answer the question of whether this law3 is an appropriate
response to the current state of the AIDS epidemic.'

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Name Reporting and Contact Tracingas Public Health Policies in
the United States
1. Name Reporting
The use of name reporting as a way of controlling
communicable disease in the United States can be traced back as far

7 See id. Burr separates the concepts of contact tracing and notification
but
for public health purposes the two are usually combined. Id.
8 See discussion infra Part
I.C.

9 See discussion infra Part I.D.
10 See infra Part II.
I ISee discussion infra Part III.A.
12See discussion infra Part III.B.
13See infra Part IV.
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as Colonial Law 14 but in the mid nineteenth century "significant
strides had been made in the area."' 15 In 1850, Lemuel Shattuck of the
Massachusetts Sanitary Commission recommended that the state
collect health data "by age, gender, occupation, socioeconomic level,

and locality."' 16

In 1850, the federal government also started to

publish national mortality statistics. 17 In thirty
years, both state and
8
federal governments collected morbidity data.'
This increased reliance on morbidity data resulted in the

increased organization of public health departments that focused on
the detection and control of the spread of infectious disease. 19 A
primary part of this process was the gathering of health information

"through reporting requirements
laboratories. 2 °

imposed

on physicians

and

Many states passed mandatory reporting laws, which
sometimes differed with one another. 21 At first, these laws used
general categories of diseases that needed to be reported.22 Reportable

categories

of

disease

included

"contagious,

infectious,

or

communicable" diseases and those diseases that were considered
"dangerous to the public health. 2 3 Later, states began to specify
14 Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The
Casefor National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REv. 679, 690 (1998).
Disease reporting has been a method of public health surveillance since 1741. Id. at 690
n.62.
'51d.
16 Id. He recommended this in a report in which he "related mortality and
communicable diseases to living conditions." Id.
17Id. The statistics were "based on the decennial census." Id.
18 Id. By 1878 there was a national data collection "on several infectious
diseases." Id.
19 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 691. The "advent of present day
public health administration" was "activated in large measure by the story of the causes of
death told by mortality statistics." Id. at 691, n.68 (quoting MILTON J. ROSENAU,
PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE AND HYGIENE 1002 (1917)).
20 Id.

21 See id. The statutes were of "varying application." Id. Many states had
statutes that "differed widely." Id. at 691, n.74 (quoting MILTON J. ROSENAU,
PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE AND HYGIENE 1003-4 (1917)).

22 See id. at 692.
23 Id.
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reportable diseases.24 At the beginning of the twentieth century
reporting was generally done through the use of notification cards that
were given to physicians by state or local health departments.2 5 On
these cards physicians were required to fill in the patient's name along
with the disease, the date that the doctor made the diagnosis and other
relevant data. 26 The notification cards were then sent by the
physician to the local or state health authorities. 27 Because reporting
requirements varied from state to state, monitoring disease nationally
was extremely difficult 28 and, therefore, the United States Public
Health Service attempted to "homogenize reporting requirements for
communicable . . . diseases., 29 By 1925, all states reported
"occurrences of certain infectious diseases to the United States Public
Health Service. 3 °
At first doctors resented state reporting laws because it
required them to breach their duty of confidentiality. 31 Some doctors
refused to abide by the reporting laws and were made liable to
criminal penalties. 32 However, despite the initial resistance and
despite the fact that physicians were later relieved from liability for
failing to follow reporting requirements through legislative and
judicial action, 33 by the late 1960s physician compliance with
24 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 692. "Only later did states begin to
delineate specific diseases for which reporting was required." Id.
25 See id. This card was called a "notification blank."
26 See id Other required information included "age, race, local address,
occupation, and occupational address." Id.
27 See id.

28 See id. (stating that the differences in the laws made "national disease
monitoring tenuous at best").
29 See Gostin & Hodge, supranote 14, at 692. "[A]s early as 1913 the United
States Public Health Service circulated a "model reporting law" but it was only passed by
a few states."3
0
1d.
31 See id. at 695 (stating that "perhaps resenting their incorporation as
'adjuncts to the public health department doctors initially objected to state reporting laws
requiring them effectively to breach their duty of confidentiality").
32 See id. at n.105 (referring to JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 110

n.14 (1926)).
33 See id. In their footnotes, the authors refer to the case Simonsen v.
Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) which held "that a physician does not violate his
duty of confidentiality to his patient by reporting cases of communicable diseases."
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reporting laws became common.3 4 Because of these developments,
patients "could no longer rely on doctors to preserve the
confidentiality of their medical records." 5
Instead, "[t]he
responsibility for preserving private medical facts ...

rested with the

individuals who might choose not to see a3physician
rather than have
6
his name reported to government officials."
2. Contact Tracing and Sexually Transmitted Disease
Although the use of regulations as a way of controlling
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) can be found as far back as
1870,37 it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that the
United States started to seriously develop a policy of identifying and
notifying those who have been exposed to possible infection. 8 There
were three important medical breakthroughs that led to the
development of modem contact tracing policy"9 : "(1) syphilis and
gonorrhea were shown to be caused by infectious organisms
transmitted through sexual contact; 40 (2) a reliable diagnostic test for
41
the diseases was developed by Dr. Adolph von Wasserman in 1907;
and (3) a medication, Salvarsan,
was identified as an effective (though
42
syphilis.
for
toxic) treatment
Because of the increased knowledge of the nature of venereal
disease transmission married women, viewed as "innocent victims,"
began to vocally challenge the traditional practice of viewing STDs as
34 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 695.
35Id.
36

1d.

37 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James Hodge, Jr., Piercingthe Veil of Secrecy
in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy in Partner

Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 18 (1998) [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge,
Piercing the Veil] (describing the "St. Louis Experiment" of 1870-1874 which required
the inspection and quarantine of prostitutes).
38 See id. at 19. "At the turn of the century, societal and medical changes
influenced the development of contact tracing." Id.
39 See id.
40 See id.

41 See id.
42 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 19.
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The concept of contact

tracing generated more interest due to the perceived injustice done to
sex partners who were not aware of their risk.44
The implementation of the contact tracing policy received a
huge push in 1936 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
appointed Dr. Thomas Parran as the Surgeon General.45 Parran's
primary public health goal was the "control and eradication of the
syphilis epidemic." 46 As part of his program he began "a national

contact tracing program." 47 Parran was a believer in studies done at
the time that tried to establish the importance of "properly executed"
contact tracing programs in fighting syphilis and described the
essential qualities of such a contact tracing program as follows:
(1) public health interviewers should emphasize the
medical aspects of the disease rather than its moral

implications; (2)confidentiality should
throughout; (3) after the names of sex
close associates are elicited from the
patient should be encouraged to notify

be stressed
partners and
patient, the
the contacts;

(4) public health departments should send a letter

advising each contact to seek medical examination;
and (5) legal measures to compel compliance should
be used only as a last resort.4 8
43 See id. at 19. "Patient confidentiality, primarily among male patients, was
considered secondary to the perceived ethical obligation to warn unsuspecting spouses or
fiancees ....Id.
44 Id. at 20. The authors quote social hygienist Dr. George Dale who in 1911
said "[w]e must insist that the man who has gonorrhea shall not marry until he is cured
and in extreme cases in which the patient refuses to take this advice, if possible the
innocentperson must be given warning." Id.at 20, n.54 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 21. Parran had training in epidemiology and preventative medicine.
Id.
46 Id. "By the 1930s one out of every ten Americans was infected with
syphilis." Id.at 21, n.58.
47 Id.at 21. Parran's "five point program for controlling syphilis consisted of
case finding, prompt therapy at no cost to the patient, contact tracing and notification,
premarital ...

and prenatal testing ... and public education." Id. at 21-22.

48 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 22. Parran
"strongly supported" this method (cited in a study done by Drs. Dudley Smith and
William A. Brumfeld) which he endorsed as being "as important as the discovery of a
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Before contact tracing's role in reducing syphilis infection
rates could be effectively explored, penicillin became available as a
curative treatment for the disease. 49 When penicillin was discovered
as a cure for syphilis, partner notification "became a standard strategy
for breaking the chain of transmission., 50 Public health officers could
contact partners and treat them immediately so that they could not
spread the infection to others. l Contemporary contact
tracing is
"primarily the responsibility of state health departments." 52
B. Contact Tracing and Name Reporting in the AIDS Epidemic: Why is
AIDS Different?
1. Current Practices
Since the disease was first detected in 1981 "national, state,
and local monitoring of the scope and impact of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic have been based primarily on AIDS surveillance."5 3 All
states have either a statute or regulation that requires laboratories and
physicians to report the names of those who are newly diagnosed with
AIDS, as defined by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 54 to local
or state health departments. 55 The mandatory case reports "follow
new drug" in controlling syphilis. Id.at n.69 (citing Thomas Parran, Abstract of
Discussion to Tracingthe Transmission of Syphilis, 101 JAMA 1957 (1933).
49 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 22.
50 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,

HIV

PARTNER NOTIFICATION: WHY

COERCION WON'T WORK,
4 (Mar. 1998) (visited March 15, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/aidslhiv_ partner.html#IlIl>.
51See id.
52 Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 25. This is because

the "differing needs of individual communities render tracing suitable to state and local
control." Id.
53Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 705.

54See Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that "[t]he CDC currently
defines AIDS in [someone] 13 years or older as the presence of one of 25 conditions
indicative of severe immunosuppression associated with HIV infection . . .or HIV
infection in an individual with a CD4+ T cell count less than 200 cells per cubic
millimeter of blood."). See also Lavin, supra note 2, at 194 n.7.
55See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 705.
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State health
uniform standards developed by the CDC. ' 56
departments then send the information on confirmed AIDS cases to
the CDC.57

Mandatory name reporting of those who test HIV positive, on

the other hand, is not nearly as unified as mandatory reporting for
AIDS. 8 When the New York State Partner Notification Law was
passed there were approximately thirty-one states that required
reporting for HIV infection. 59 Some have criticized this difference in
policy between HIV reporting and full-blown AIDS reporting as
illogical and potentially dangerous.6 °
The idea of using contact tracing for AIDS and HIV infection
has always been fiercely resisted by gay rights activists,61 civil
6
62
63
while
health officials.
As a result,
libertarians,
andto some
public
programs,
mandatory
partner notification
some states tried
establish

56 Id.
The information that is collected for each case includes
"demographics, diagnostic facility, patient risk history, laboratory analysis, clinical status,
and treatment/service referrals." Id.
57 See id.
58 See Burr, supra note 6, at 15. "Although the disease called AIDS must
be reported by name in all fifty states, infection with HIV... need not be."
59 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 706 (indicating that as of the time
the article was published thirty one states required HIV surveillance).
60 See Burr, supra note 6, at 16 (arguing that "requiring the reporting of
AIDS but not HIV seems equivalent to requiring, say, that full blown cases of Hepatitis B
be reported but not any newly detected infections with the hepatitis virus" but is actually
worse because "the period between infection with HIV and a diagnosis of AIDS is often
longer than ten years" while hepatitis B has an incubation period of two or three months).
61 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 25. When San
Francisco tried to implement a contact tracing program for bisexual men in 1985 the gay
community fiercely opposed the plan as "Orwellian." Id. at 25, n.90 (citing RONALD
BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC

HEALTH 124 (1990).
62 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at 3 (stating that
"the ACLU adamantly opposes.., plans that require individual with HIV to provide the
names of their partners to public health authorities .... ").
63 See Burr, supra note 6, at 4. Burr quotes a UCLA epidemiologist as
saying that there are many "public health officials ... [who] 'have remained steadfast in
their commitment to [public health] programs and approaches that have hidden the
identity of HIV carriers but have failed to halt viral transmission' - a commitment that is
in the end bound to prove self-defeating." Id. See also Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil,
supra note 37, at 25.
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"most programs and state educational initiatives focused on
individuals protecting themselves from infection." 64 Public health
officials emphasized the infected patient's personal duty to give notice
to their partners.65
Although contact tracing has not been federally mandated, the
CDC provides funding to local and state health departments "to
perform a variety of testing, screening and partner notification
services related to the HIV epidemic." 66 In order to be eligible for
funding, state health departments must "implement partner
notification programs according to CDC guidelines. 67 However,
with this system, standards, practices and procedures tend to vary a
great deal from state to state. 68
The CDC's guidelines allow state public health officials to
follow two major partner notification models: patient referral and
provider referral.69 The patient referral model asks the patient to
contact their past and present sex partners and those with whom they
have shared needles and syringes. 70 Patients are assisted by public
health officials who provide "counseling, education contact cards, and
telephone or mail reminders to the patient.",7 1 The provider referral
model puts the responsibility for notification in the hands of trained
public health personnel that "locate contacts based on names,
descriptions, and addresses provided by. .. patients." 72 Partners are
6

See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 37, at 25.

65

See id.

661d.at 26.
67 Id. The CDC's parameters for "partner notification services"
require
federally funded contact tracing programs "to provide a comprehensive set of
supplemental services, including testing, medical treatment, and counseling, in addition to
19 (stating that "all states
notification assistance." See also Burr, supra note 6, at
technically have something that they can point to as a 'partner-notification program,'
having such a program being a prerequisite for obtaining certain federal funds.").
68 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 26. The authors
indicate that while "[many] states statutorily have authorized public health authorities at
the state of local level to utilize contact tracing" in order to fight HIV/AIDS, "the law of
these jurisdictions varies." Id. at 27.
69 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supranote 37, at 26.
70
See id. at 27.

71

Id.

72

Id.
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provided with information regarding their exposure and the steps that
should be taken in a counseled environment, preferably in a face to
face meeting with a public health professional.73 The name of the
patient who exposed the partner to HIV is kept confidential
although,
74
in many instances the patient is able to deduce who it is.
A third model, called conditional referral, is a hybrid of the
patient and provider referral models.75 In conditional referral, a public
health official obtains the names and relative information of the
patient's partners but gives the patient a designated period of time to
contact them himself.76 If the contact is not notified within that time
period, "a public health worker informs [the partners] of77 their
exposure while keeping the identity of the patient confidential.,
In terms of effectiveness, provider referral programs, while
markedly more expensive to implement because of the requisite
personnel and resources, have a distinct advantage over patient
referral programs 78 (conditional referral shares the strengths and
weaknesses of both approaches). 79 With patient referral programs
there is no way to make sure that the partners are actually notified.80
In addition, even if the patient did notify his or her partner, health
officials have little control over the quality of the information that the
patient actually conveyed. 81 In provider referral programs, when
public health personnel contact partners, testing and counseling are
also made more readily available to those that are possibly infected.82
73See id.
74 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 37, at 27 (noting that
the patient's confidentiality is protected by officials declining to reveal his name to his
contact).
75See id. Conditional referral "often prevails in modem practice." Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.

78 See generally id. (comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the two
programs); see also Burr, supra note 6, at 20 (contrasting the effectiveness of the two
approaches to referral).
79 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 37, at 27.
80 See id.
81See id.

82 See Burr, supra note 6, at

20. Burr also notes that provider referral

programs "find a larger portion of other infected people." Id.
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or her infection and begins
"The sooner a person knows of his 83
prognosis."
their
better
the
treatment..
2. Why is AIDS Different?
The fact that the application of name reporting and contact

tracing to AIDS and HIV has been so tentative and controversial has
led to accusations of "AIDS Exceptionalism."8 4 The traditional
argument of those who charge "AIDS Exceptionalism" is that

governments have allowed the politics of the disease to stand in the
way of public health, putting civil liberties before lives.8 5 Those who
favor applying traditional public health measures to AIDS and HIV
infection86often say that we need to start treating AIDS like every other
disease.

Ironically, the reasons for the difference in the public health
approach when it comes to AIDS and HIV infections lie in part in the

ways that AIDS is "just like" other infectious diseases, particularly
other STDs. 87 When the epidemic started, AIDS was primarily (and,
to a large degree, justifiably) viewed as a disease of urban homosexual
men, prostitutes and intravenous drug users. 88 The stigma attached to
these groups is very similar to the stigma attached to the sex

syphilitics and prostitutes during the early twentieth century's syphilis
epidemic. 89 And although one of the arguments given by civil
libertarians and activists to distinguish AIDS from other diseases is
83 Id.
84 Id. The entire premise of Burr's polemical article is that AIDS is treated as

a civil rights issue as opposed to a public health issue and that this approach must end. Id.
85 See id. at 25; see also Mark Schoofs, What's in a Name?, VILLAGE
VOICE, Apr. 7, 1998, at 36 (presenting the arguments of those who favor name reporting
for HIV).
86 See Baker, supra note 3 (quoting Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn,
sponsor of New York's Partner Notification Law); see also Schoofs, supra note 85; see
also Burr, supra note 6.
87 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 23-24. The
authors note that "the HIV/AIDS epidemic" has "presented challenges similar to those of
other STDs like syphilis." Id.
88 Id. at 24; see also Burr, supra note 6, at 6.
89 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 37, at 24. "Fear and
stigmatization of those infected initially prevailed during both epidemics." Id.
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that AIDS is fatal and incurable, in earlier eras other communicable
diseases were fatal as well.90 The primary difference
between AIDS
91
timing.
be
to
seems
diseases
infectious
and other
AIDS was first diagnosed in the early 1980s, 92 while the
regulatory structures that govern other communicable diseases were
established in the decades before "the judicial expansion of civil
liberties that began in the 1960s." 93 This was coupled with the fact
that one of AIDS' principally afflicted groups, homosexual men, had
"found their political voice" shortly before the crisis began94 and

focused public attention on the possibilities for discrimination against
those with the disease. 95 Those who argue that AIDS has gotten
special treatment often like to paint a picture of governments caving
into powerful gay rights lobbyists at the expense of public health.96 A
more instructive question might be if any sexually transmitted disease
that came along today, particularly one that primarily impacts
communities that are already marginalized, would have been regulated
the same way that earlier diseases were? 97 A brief look at the
90 See Hermes Fernandez, Is AIDS Different?, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1053, 1070
(1998).

91See id.at 1054 (pondering whether the varying treatment of AIDS is
"simply a reflection of the politics of the times").
92 See Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that "[AIDS] was first
recognized in 1981 and has since become a major worldwide epidemic."). See also
Lavin, supra note 2, at 194 (stating that "the first American cases of [AIDS] were
reported in 1981").
93Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1054. Many of these court cases focused "on
the right to privacy, including a right to privacy in the health care context." Id. at 1073.
The case law that was developing emphasized personal autonomy in healthcare decisions.
Id.Fernandez refers to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which held that a woman's
right to privacy includes the decision to terminate her pregnancy, and In re Karen
Quinlan, 355 A.2d. 647 (N.J. 1976) that placed healthcare decisions in the right to
privacy. Id.at 1073, n.179.
94 Id. at 1072.
95 See id. at 1073 (reporting that AIDS activists argued for the need for
protection against discrimination).
96 See Burr, supra note 6, at 7 (declaring that "in the aftermath of anti-gay
persecution and even violence, the price exacted by a terrified gay community for
cooperation in even a rudimentary public health effort was ironclad anonymity.").
97See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1054 (asking "[i]f sexually transmissible
diseases

. .

. burst upon the scene today . . . as AIDS did in the 1980s, would the

medical/legal response be the same?").
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development of New York State's own AIDS public health strategy
might shed some light on the challenges of handling a brand-new
epidemic in the modem era of increased civil liberties.
C. New York State's ConfidentialityLaw: The Story of Article 27-F
By 1988 the cause of AIDS was found to be the HIV virus, the
exchange of bodily fluids was identified as the means of transmission
and, effective tests had been developed to identify those who were
infected with HIV. 98 In addition, the drug AZT 99 was discovered to

be a promising form of treatment. 100 These developments created a
public imperative to cause AIDS' at risk population to get tested.''
The State legislature responded to this imperative by enacting Article
02
27-F of the Public Health Law,1
which came to be known as the
10 3
Law."'
Confidentiality
"AIDS
The AIDS Confidentiality Law finds its foundation in the idea
that, where AIDS is concerned, public health is best protected by0 a4
treatment system that is both voluntary and highly confidential.
Civil liberties and stopping the spread of the disease are given equal
importance. 10 5 The statute's emphasis on civil liberties was unique
among New York State's public health laws.'0 6 Previously, in matters
of public health, the balance of 10interests
had valued public protection
7
over the rights of the individual.
98 See id. at 1056-57. Scientists developed a way to perform serologic testing

for HIV antibodies. Id.at 1057, n.34.
99 Id. at 1056, n.32. "AZT" is an abbreviation for the name of the drug
Azidothymidine.
Id.
0
10
See id. at 1057.
101See id.
102N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney 1993).
103 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1057.
104See
105See

id. at 1057.
id.

106 See id.
107 See id. at 1058. Under previous public health law concerning
communicable and sexually transmissible diseases testing, partner notification and
treatment were mandatory. Id.at 1064. There was also authority to quarantine, isolate
and destroy property. Id. at 1065. If New York's Health Commissioners hadn't declined
to classify AIDS as a "sexually transmissible disease," most of these coercive control
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Article 27-F presumed that voluntary testing is the best way to

fight the epidemic.' 0 8 As such, with narrow exceptions, it prohibited
the use of involuntary testing. 10 9 Informed consent required that
healthcare providers explain that the test was voluntary, and that the

patient can choose to be tested anonymously instead." 10 To insure that
the test was truly voluntary the law also required that the test givers

counsel the patient on the possibility of discrimination because of HIV
positive status.' '
The law also placed extreme limits on the disclosure of
confidential HIV information." 2 Disclosure was essentially permitted
in four categories: "health care providers, insurers, child care givers,
and correctional system administrators."''113 Clearly, the list was
confined to those that would need HIV information to properly help
the person who was infected. 1 4 Left out were the patient's past and
current sexual and needle sharing partners, arguably the people with
the greatest need to know.15

However, it must be emphasized that the confidentiality law
did not prohibit contact tracing." 6 There were two primary
circumstances when it was permitted.' 7 The first circumstance was

methods would have been put into effect. Id. at 1069-70.
108 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1057 (calling this presumption one of the
law's "striking features").
109 Id.; see also N.Y. PUB. HEATH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney 1993)
(mandating that "no person shall order the performance of an HIV related test without
first receiving the written, informed consent of the subject").
110 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1060; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§
2781 (2)(b).
III See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1060; see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
2781(3) (ordering that test subject be provided with "information about discrimination
problems that disclosure of the test result could cause").
112See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1061 (characterizing disclosure under the
law as being on a "need to know basis").
113See id; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(1)

(detailing the

exceptions to the confidentiality rule).
114See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1061.
115
See id. at 1062.
116
See id. (noting that contact was "permitted under certain circumstances").
117
Seeid. at 1063.
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when the patient gave consent.1" 8 In fact, the law required that a
person be counseled to notify his past contacts when he was given his
test results. 119 The second circumstance was when a physician was

given discretionary authority to notify contacts without a patient's
consent. 12 In order to do this, the physician had to "reasonably
believe" that the disclosure was appropriate, that the contact had a
"significant risk of infection" and that the infected party would not
notify the contact even though he had been counseled to do so.'21
After the physician has gone through this analysis, he still had to
inform the patient that he intended to make contact and give his

patient the option of having the physician or a public health official do
the notification.' 22 However, few doctors used this option. 123 This
might be because although there was no legal obligation to perform

contact tracing 124
an improper disclosure could bring criminal and
25
1
penalties.
civil
The AIDS Confidentiality Law was not simply an exercise in
the abstract principles of civil liberty since its approach was
fundamentally practical. 126 The law protected the infected in order to

persuade them to go into treatment, alter their behavior, and report
118 Id.; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(1)(b) (allowing disclosure

when its "authorized pursuant to a release").
119 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1063; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2781(5)(e) (requiring that test subject be provided with counseling "regarding [his] need
to notify ... contacts").

120 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1063.
121 Id.; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (4)(a)(2)&(3).
122 See N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (4)(a)(4).
123 See Dennis Duggan, Mayersohn Proudof HIV Bill, NEWSDAY, June 23,
1998, at A6 (quoting Dr. Lloyd Novick of the New York State AIDS Advisory Council as
saying that in 1997 there were only 800 cases of partner notification in all of New York
State even though there were over 10,000 infections).
124 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1064; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §

2783(3)(a) (declaring that "there shall be no criminal or civil liability ... [for] the failure
to disclose confidential HIV related information to a contact")..
125 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1064; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §

2783(1)(b) (imposing a maximum civil penalty of five thousand dollars per occurrence);
N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2783(2) (declaring improper disclosure to be a misdemeanor).
126 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1073 (stating that the law took shape the
way it did because of the "practicalities of the situation").
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their status to their sexual and needle sharing partners. 127 Unless they
were assured of strict confidentiality, those most in danger of
infection would most likely have declined to become part of the health
care system until they absolutely had to.' 28 And so, although the law
has a strong emphasis on individual
rights, its primary purpose was to
129
preserve the public health.

D. The Push to End Confidentiality
As indicated above, the use of different public health methods
130
to control the spread of AIDS has always been hotly debated.
However, there have been a few developments in recent years that
have led to a reevaluation of the use of name reporting and contact
tracing. 13 1 One of the most significant changes is that since 1988
AIDS treatments have become more successful. 3 2
The life

expectancy and quality of life of those with AIDS have been greatly
extended. 133 The development of the use of protease inhibitors on

those who are HIV positive has been shown to delay the progression
of the development of the disease of AIDS.

34

These new treatments

even bring hope that AIDS may someday evolve from a deadly illness
into a chronic disease. 135 The possibility of slowing the course of HIV
infection has increased the importance of early identification of those
127 See id. at 1062.
128 See id. at 1073-74.
129 See id. at 1074.
130 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 25 (discussing
the resistance that certain groups have to the use of traditional public health methods such
as contact tracing).
13 1See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1075 (asking whether Article 27-F should
be altered to become more like other public health measures).
132 See id. at 1075 (discussing the encouraging development of the new
"AIDS cocktail" drug treatment).
133 See id (reporting that with the new treatments people with AIDS "are
living longer and healthier").
134 See Gostin and Hodge, supra note 14, at 700; see also Fernandez, supra
note 90, at 1075, n.189 (citing articles from the Journal of the American Medical
Association which call these treatments "life prolonging" and a "gateway into a new era
of managing HIV disease").
135 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1075.
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with HIV infection. 136 Some have proposed that because there are
better AIDS treatments, contact tracing should probably be a larger

part of AIDS control. 137 Even the Gay Men's Health Crisis, one of the
leading AIDS activist organizations, has advocated the reporting and
tracking of HIV 38positive individuals (although they don't support
name reporting). 1
Another important development in the approach to AIDS
139
legislation has been a shift in the demographics of those at risk.
The origins of the New York State's Partner Notification law
stemmed from a heightened awareness that women, especially poor
black and Hispanic women, are at high risk for infection. 14 Queens
Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn,1 41 the sponsor of the law, said
she was inspired to address the partner notification issue after reading
a 1993 New York Newsday article by Nina Bernstein regarding the
plight of women who were not told that their partners had AIDS. 42 In
one of her articles, Bernstein reported an increase in new female
AIDS cases due to heterosexual transmission. 43 She also suggested
that the needs of poor black and Hispanic women were weighted less
heavily in the balance of privacy and protection that was debated
when the law was originally written. 144 These women were powerful
symbols of an apparently unjust system, not unlike the syphilitic

136 See Burr, supra note 6, at

20 (declaring that early awareness of HIV

infection makes for a better prognosis).
137 Id. at 1076. "Perhaps there is a greater role for contact tracing now that
somewhat effective treatments are available." Id.
138 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1075.
139
See Nina Bernstein, In Grave Danger. NY's Partner Notification Policy
Puts Women at Risk, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 1993, at 7. (reporting "[a] new debate on the
importance of partner notification is taking shape as the incidence of infection shifts from
middle class gay
males to other populations...").
140See id. (naming poor black an Hispanic women as a new population at
risk).
14 1
See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6.
142 See id.

143See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 7. (reporting that 30.7 percent of the new
female AIDS cases in 1992 were due to heterosexual transmission).
144 See id.
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wives at the beginning of the century. 145 The Partner Notification
Bill, sponsored by Mayersohn, 146 sat for several years before it was
finally passed in July of 1998.141
Some have suggested that part of the reason the law ultimately
passed was the outcry of public opinion following the case of
Nushawn Williams, a 21-year-old black man from Brooklyn who
"apparently infected 13 women, most of them white, in upstate
Chautauqua County."1 48 The egregiousness of the Williams case
created extensive press coverage and served as a "clarion call" for
pundits and politicians who advocated a more restrictive AIDS
policy. 14 9 Ironically, many have admitted that the Williams case,
despite its alarming implications, was one instance when New York's
voluntary system of partner notification actually worked. 150 When
Williams tested positive for HIV in 1996, he voluntarily revealed the
names of his sex partners prior to learning of his HIV status, enabling
health officials to contact the women.1 5 1 Unfortunately, after testing
positive, Williams continued to have unprotected sex.' 52 Almost a
145 See id.; see also Nina Bernstein, Death by Silence, a Failure
to Notify

Costs Lives, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1993, at 7. Much of Bernstein's writing is devoted to recounting heart-wrenching tales of women who were not told that their husbands had
AIDS. See id. Most became HIV-positive themselves and some had children who were
HIV-positive as well. See id.
146 S.4422-B, 221st Leg., Reg. Sess., 1998 N.Y. Laws 584.
147 See Precious, supra note 3, at IC (reporting that Mayersohn "pushed" the
bill "for years").
148 Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36 (calling Williams "one of the most
influential people in AIDS Policy"); see also Sentenced in Spread ofHIV, NEWSDAY, Apr.
6, 1999, at A28. Nushawn Williams pleaded guilty to statutory rape as well as reckless
endangerment and was sentenced to 4 to 12 years in prison. Id.
149See Richard Goldstein, Demon Seed, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 11, 1997, at
46 (quoting a New York Post editorial decrying "the folly of AIDS privacy" and State
Attorney General Dennis Vacco's use of the case to denounce the states's HIV
confidentiality laws); see also Joseph Dolman, How Chance Led New York to a Good
HIV Law, NEWSDAY, June 25, 1998, at A48 (suggesting public fear caused by the
Williams case lead to passage of the Mayersohn Bill).
150See Dolman, supra note 149, at 46; see also Richard N. Gottfried, Lessons
from Chautauqua County, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1998) (arguing that rather than
"get in the way," the system actually prevented the Williams case "from being much
worse").

151 See Gottfried, supra note 150, at 1082-83.
152 See id. at 1083.
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year later, several other women tested positive and described partners
fitting Williams' description. The 1988 law authorized health and law
enforcement officials to track Williams down and to obtain a court
order permitting disclosure of Williams' name and picture to the
public on the grounds of "clear and imminent danger to the public
health.0

53

The public health laws, as they existed at that time,

enabled health officials to obtain and use the information they needed
in order to stop Williams.' 54 Even the new partner notification law
could not have prevented Williams from having unprotected sex with
women after testing positive. 151

Still, the publicity surrounding the Williams case probably
helped pass the formerly stalled bill. 156 Also helpful, was a bill passed

by Mayersohn a few years earlier that allowed the disclosure of HIV
test results of newborns to their parents. 157

AIDS" law

158

AIDS policy.

The so-called "baby

may have been the first step toward altering the existing
59

In any event, despite the vehement protests of AIDS

153Id. at 1083-84. Law enforcement was involved because some of the
young women in question were underage. See id. See also N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW §
2785(2)(c)(McKinney 1993) (allowing for court-ordered HIV disclosure when there is a
danger to public
heath).
154
See Gottfried, supra note 150, at 1084 (explaining why the law "did not
'get in the way'
in the Williams case).
155See Dolman, supra note 149, at A48 (explaining that "[e]ven with the new
law, New Yorkers will be no safer from sexual predators than before").
156 See id.; see also Precious, supra note 3, at 1C. "In state legislation pushed
along by the Nushawn Williams HIV case, sex partners of individuals infected with the
AIDS virus in New York would be notified of their possible exposure." Id. The Precious
article also quotes Assemblyman Alexander Grannis (D-Manhattan) as saying that the
Bill "plays up157to the hysteria caused by Nushawn Williams." Id.
See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6 (calling the Bill Mayersohn's second
"significant" AIDS health victory in five years); see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2500f (McKinney 1993) (mandating HIV-testing program for newborns); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2781(6)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (waiving confidentiality requirements for the
newborn testing program); see also Monte R. Young, Moms to Get Results of Baby AIDS
Tests, NEWSDAY, June 27, 1996, at A40. Prior to the law, New York tested all newborns
for HIV in order to track the epidemic, but the results were withheld from the mother due
to the confidentiality law. Id.
158
See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6.
159
See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1076 (pointing out that in the wake of the
"baby AIDS" law none of the dire predictions about fear of entering the healthcare system
have come to pass).
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activists, 160 dismissed by some as a "vocal minority,"' 161 the bill was
passed by overwhelming majorities in the State Senate and
63
Assembly' 62 and signed by Governor Pataki into law. 1
II. THE HIV

PARTNER NOTIFICATION BILL: ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW

For all of the controversy and emotion surrounding it, the HIV
Partner Notification Bill states its objective in rather understated and
neutral language: "An Act to amend the public health law in relation
to human immunodeficiency virus infection and reporting cases of
such infection to spouses and known sexual partners."'164 In order to
understand the possible implications of what Assemblywoman
Mayersohn calls "the most important piece of legislation that I have
ever done, 165 we must first examine what the law actually says.
A. Duty to Report. Physiciansand Health Commissioners
The statute imposes a duty on physicians and "other persons
authorized by law to order diagnostic tests or make a medical
diagnosis," as well as laboratories performing HIV tests, to
immediately report cases of HIV infection, HIV related illness, and
AIDS to the State Health Commissioner. 66 The state commissioner
then forwards each report to the health commissioner of the
167
municipality where the "disease, illness, or infection occurred.'
The report would include the name of the patient who is HIV-positive
160

See Baker, supra note 3, at A7 (reporting that the Bill "pitted AIDS

activists and members of the gay community" against those who argued for the use of
traditional disease
control methods to fight AIDS).
161See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6 (quoting Dr. Monica Sweeney, who
runs a family health center in the Bedford Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn).
162 Se id. The Bill was passed by a vote of 55-6 in the New York State
Senate and 112-34 in the New York State Assembly. Id.
163 See S. 4422-B, 22 1st Leg., Reg. Sess., 1998 N.Y. Laws 584.
164Id.
165 Duggan, supra note 123, at A6.
166 See S. 4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, 2130(1), 1998 N.Y. Laws 584 (codified at
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999)).
167

Id. 2130(2).
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as well as the names, if available, of any contacts of the patient known
to the physician or provided by the infected person. 168 In other words,
when a person tests positive for HIV, or is treated for an AIDS or HIV
related illness, their names will be released to the State Department of
of contact tracing.169

Health ("DOH") for the purpose
The law does have some safety precautions built in for the

protection of the patient. 170 First, the bill expressly preserves the
option of anonymous testing.' 71 However, a person who is treated for

HIV, should expect that his or her treating physician will report his or
her name to DOH. 7 2 Second, all of the information gathered by DOH
is to remain confidential.1 73 Since AIDS reporting began in 1983,
74
there have been no reported breaches of confidentiality. 1
B. Contact Tracing: Debunking the Myth
Perhaps the most startling aspect of the. partner notification
law is that the law does not require a person to disclose the names of

his or her sexual partners, spouses, or drug users with whom needles
were shared. 175 The law expressly states that no criminal or civil

liability will accrue to anyone who refuses to cooperate with contact
tracing. 176 If a physician knows of a contact (a spouse or a domestic

partner) he can then provide that name to DOH without his patient's
168 See id. § 2130(3).

A contact is "a spouse or sex partner or a person

identified as having shared a hypodermic needle with" the infected person. Id. 2
(codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (10) (McKinney Supp. 1999)).
169 See id.§ 2130(1).
170 See id. § 2138 (maintaining anonymous testing); see also id. § 2135
(maintaining confidentiality of HIV information).
171 See S. 4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, § 2138, 1998 N.Y. Laws 586 (codified at
N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2138 (McKinney Supp. 1999)). "Nothing in this article shall
be interpreted to eliminate the anonymous testing option..." Id.
172 See id.§ 2130(1) (mandating doctors to report cases of HIV infection and
HIV-related illness).
173See id. § 2135.
174 See GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, PARTNER NOTIFICATION IN
NEW YORK
STATE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1998).
175See id.
176 See S. 4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, § 2136(3), 1998 N.Y. Laws 586 (codified
at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2136(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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consent; but a person cannot be forced to reveal the names of contacts
against his or her will. 177 At this point, it is unclear whether DOH will
be able to receive information from a marriage or domestic
partnership registry to conduct contact tracing. 178 It is also uncertain
whether the law applies retroactively to those who were found to be
HIV-positive before the law is enacted, 179 although such application
seems very likely. 180 These uncertainties may become clearer when
DOH institutes rules and regulations in accordance with the statute.' 81
When the contacts are notified the law requires that they be
the known routes of transmission,"
informed of "the nature of HIV,....
"the risks of prenatal and perinatal transmission" (as circumstances
require), and "actions that he or she can take to limit further
transmission of the virus."' 82 The law also requires that the contact be
informed of facilities where counseling and treatment for those with
never learns the name of the person
HIV are available. 183 The contact
18 4
who exposed him or her to HIV.

177 See id. See also GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, supra note 174. "There is

nothing in the law which requires you to name your sexual or needle sharing partners.
You also cannot be punished or denied care if you refuse to name contacts."
178 See GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, supra note 174.
179 See id.
180See Lynda Richardson, Rules on HIV Reporting and PartnerNotices Set,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999, at B5. The State Health Department released proposed
regulations that apply the law to those who were HIV-positive before the law went into
effect. See id.
181 See id. (reporting the proposed rules were released on March 17, 1999,
and will under go a 45-day public comment period.); see also S. 4422-B, sec. 1, § 2139
(mandating the commissioner to promulgate all "necessary and proper" rules and
regulations); see also S. 4422-B, sec. 1, § 2137 (stating that a protocol will be developed
for the identification and screening of victims of domestic violence).
182 S.4422-B, sec. 1, § 2133(2).
183 See id.
184 See id. at § 2133 (3). This is consistent with the established protocol of
contact-tracing laws.
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III. THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF THE PARTNER NOTIFICATION LAW

A. Privacy

1. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
Although people living with AIDS or HIV have very strong
reasons for desiring privacy, 185 their actual right to privacy may be
severely limited. 186 The Constitution does not confer an express right
to privacy,' 87 but a body of case law suggests "a limited right to
informational privacy within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution.' ' 188 The leading case in which the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the constitutional right vis-A-vis the collection,
storage and dissemination of health information by the government is
Whalen v. Roe. 189 Whalen involved a New York State statute that
required physicians to disclose to the state information about
prescriptions for drugs with a high potential for abuse. 190 The statute
also required the data to be stored in a central computer. 19 ' The Court
recognized the threat to privacy implicit in the government's
collection of vast amounts of personal information as well as the duty
92
to avoid unwarranted disclosures with roots in the Constitution.
However, the Court found no constitutional violation where the state
had adequate procedures for protecting the sensitive medical
185
186

See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 728.
See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET. AL., LEGISLATIVE

SURVEY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS, WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON HIV AND IMMUNIZATION,

130

(1998) (visited April 11, 2000) <ftp://ftp.cdcnpin.org/Reports/StateLaw.wpd> (reporting
that the Supreme Court is in a period of retrenchment of constitutional protection for
decisional and informational privacy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109
S.Ct. 3040 (1989);
and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-14 (1976)).
t
87See 424 U.S. at 712, 714.
188
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V § XIV.
189 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 605.
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information.
Lower courts have interpreted Whalen as limiting the right to
informational privacy in medical records. 194 Statutory reporting
requirements that are upheld tend to be "those in which the
government has advanced a need to acquire the informatibn '' to
95
develop treatment programs or control threats to public health."
When the government expresses a valid social purpose 196 and
197
implements a reasonable amount of security to protect the data,

courts typically
permit government collection of public health
198
information.

Given this judicial tendency, it is highly unlikely that the
courts will find New York's Partner Notification Law violates the
constitutional right to privacy. 199 Courts are likely to find that
controlling the spread of AIDS and HIV is a substantial, if not
compelling, government interest. 200 New York would merely need to
show that it exercises adequate precautions to prevent casual
disclosure of its data. 201 The text of the bill expressly states that the
193 See 429 U.S. at 605. "New York's statutory scheme and its implementing
administrative procedures evidence a proper concern with and protection of the
individual's interest in privacy .... We hold that this record does not establish an
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
194
See United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). "In
recognition that the right of an individual to control access to her or his medical history is
not absolute, courts ... have determined that public health may support access to facts an
individual might otherwise choose to withhold." Id.
195
Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
196 See id. (indicating that when courts allow intrusion into medical records, it
is usually because "societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest on the
specific facts 97
of the case").
1 See id. at 579-80 (citing Whalen v. Roe and Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,
440 U.S. 301(1979), for the proposition that effective security against unauthorized
disclosure is necessary before a court can decide that intrusion on a person's medical
privacy is justified).
198See GOSTIN, ET AL., supra note 186, at 136.
199 See id. (arguing that "U]udicial deference to government expression of the
need to acquire information is an unmistakable theme running through the case law").
200 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (indicating that a government interest
in public heath can support access to a person's medical history).
201 See id. at 579-80 (establishing the need for effective security against
unauthorized disclosure).
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information gathered is confidential,20 2 and New York's record of
protecting confidential public health information would weigh very

heavily in its favor.20 3 Unless there is a radical change in the courts'
approach to privacy, state legislatures (and perhaps Congress as well)
reporting and contact tracing
will be ,able to conduct HIV name
20 4
without much judicial interference.
2. Doctor Patient Confidentiality

When a patient discloses personal information to a health care
professional, the professional can often be held liable for disclosing

that information to a third party without permission. 20 5 In tort law,
20 6
this claim is described as a claim for breach of confidentiality,

which often conflicts with the duty to warn. 20 7 This principle, most
famously recognized in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
2 °8 requires a healthcare worker, when confronted with a
California,
foreseeable danger to a third party by one of his or her patients, to

warn that third party of the danger.20 9 In the context of AIDS
information, a healthcare worker would have a duty to warn if he or
she is reasonably aware that a third party is in danger of contracting
HIV or AIDS from his or her patient. 210 New York has addressed the
202 See S. 4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, § 2135, 1998 N.Y. Laws 585 (codified at

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2135 (McKinney Supp. 1999)) (stating "all reports or
information secured by the department ... shall be kept confidential except in so far as
necessary to carry out the provisions of this title"); see also S. 4422-B, sec. 1, § 2133(3)
(forbidding the disclosure of the HIV-infected individual to their contact).
203 See GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, supra note 174 (reporting that there has
yet to be a breach in confidentiality in the reporting of AIDS cases in New York State).
204 See GOSTIN, ET. AL., supra note 186, at 137-38. "Absent an unlikely shift
in the courts' approach to privacy ... issues of health informational privacy will, for the
most part, be settled in the legislative and executive branches of government." Id.
205 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercingthe Veil, supra note 37, at 43.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 43-44.
Plaintiffs brought action against the
208 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
psychologist of the man who murdered their daughter because the doctor failed to warn
the victim of his patient's murderous intentions. Id.
209 See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 37, at 42.
210 See id.
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conflict between the duty to warn and doctor-patient confidentiality
by statute. 2 1' Even before the Partner Notification Law was passed,
physicians had limited authority to warn a third party that their patient
had exposed him or her to HIV.21 2 Through the Partner Notification

Law, the state has expressly exempted physicians from .criminal
sanction or civil liability arising from disclosure of confidential HIV21 3
related information in compliance with the statute.

3. Discrimination
The possibility of discrimination against persons with AIDS or
HIV is a serious concern and one of the primary arguments against
name reporting and contact tracing.21 4 Given that AIDS cannot be
transmitted through casual contact, discrimination in areas such as

employment and housing is particularly odious. 21 5 Advocates of the
Partner Notification Law argue that all of the information gathered by
public health officials is held strictly confidential.216
However, critics of the law have pointed out a few well
publicized (though exceptional) breaches of confidentiality that
occurred in other states. 21 7 One of the most infamous breaches

occurred in Florida when "the disgruntled lover of a health department
worker mailed computer disks containing the names of more than
2 18
[thirty-nine hundred] HIV-positive individuals to two newspapers."
211 See infra Part 1.C. (indicating that limited authority to warn a third party
was part of Article 27-F); see also S. 4422-B, ch. 163, § 6(3)(b), 1998 N.Y. Laws 587
(codified at N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999)) (exempting
physicians from any criminal or civil liability due to their disclosure of HIV information).
212 See infra Part I.C. (reviewing New York State's Confidentiality Law).
213 See S. 4422-B, §6 (3)(b) (codified at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2783(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
214 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 724; see also Burr, supra note6,
at
23 (listing the reasons given to justify "AIDS Exceptionalism," some of which are
founded in the stigma of the disease); see also Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36 (pointing out
that prejudices against those with HIV and AIDS still exist).
215 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 724.
216 See S. 4422-B, sec. 1, § 2135 (codified at N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
LAW § 2135
(McKinney Supp. 1999)).
217 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36; see also Gostin & Hodge, supra note
14, at 732.

218 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.
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There were also other incidents where HIV information was stolen or
inexplicably disappeared.2 19 More disturbing is the possibility that the
government will simply revoke its confidentiality protections. 22' This
almost happened in 1991, when the Illinois state legislature enacted
legislation requiring the state health department to identify HIVpositive health care workers "by cross matching the AIDS registry
against" the records of people who were granted healthcare
licenses.22 '
Partner notification advocates argue that even if
confidentiality is somehow breached or revoked, there are a number of
statutes that bar discrimination based upon HIV-status. 222 New York
had such a statute even before the HIV confidentiality law was
enacted in 1988.223 In addition, the Supreme Court in Bragdon v.
Abbott 224 held that HIV infection is a "disability" pr6tected under the
Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities by private
actors and state and local governments. 225 The Rehabilitation Act of
1973226 also bars discrimination by the federal government and those
that receive federal funding.2 27 Together these laws' should provide
228
sufficient anti-discrimination protection for HIV infected persons.
However, just because discrimination is outlawed does not mean it
219 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 732 (discussing cases cited by the

ACLU that took place in California and New York, respectively).
220 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36. Schoofs refers to this as "the ultimate
fear." Id.
221 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 732. The legislation was never
implemented. Id. See also Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36. "Opposition from public health
officials managed to block funding for the procedure." Id.
222 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1998); see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 710- 797.b (1994).

223 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(l)(a) (prohibiting discnhmination based on

disability).

224 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). In Bragdon a patient who was HIV-positive sued

a dentist under the ADA because he denied her treatment. Id.

225 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213; see also Gostin & Hodge, supra

note 14, at 725.
226 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-797.b (1994).
Id.; see also Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 725.
228 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 725.
227
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does not occur.229 It is also argued that such laws can do nothing to
protect the HIV-positive person rejected by family, friends and
associates; "which can be much more230devastating than losing a job or
being turned down for an apartment."
B. Public Health
The fundamental public health question that should be
addressed is "How will this new law help stop the spread of HIV?" If
the purpose of this law is to stop sexually irresponsible people like
Nushawn Williams from knowingly infecting partners, then it is
woefully inadequate. 23 1 No partner notification law could possibly
reach a casual sex partner before they have been exposed to HIV.232
The law may be better suited to preventing infection of individuals in
serious, long-term relationships, but even this is problematic. A
partner is only traced if a physician or healthcare worker is aware of
their existence (unless DOH plans to cross-reference HIV data with
marriage and domestic partner registries for the purpose of
notification).233 Although a treating physician may be aware of a
spouse or lover, nothing can prevent a determined patient from lying
about the existence of either. 234 Further if, as Assemblywoman
Mayersohn has said, this law is made for "irresponsible people, 235
then it is unable to affect the people that we have to worry about the
most. The legislation is limited by a very fundamental fact:
229 See Gottfried, supra note 151, at 1085.
230 Id.

231 See Dolman, supra note 149, at A48.
232 See id.

233 See GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, supra note 174. "[lit is unclear whether
the DOH will retrieve... information from a marriage or domestic partnership
registry.. however, if the physician knows of a contact they may provide that person's
name with or without your consent ...
" Id.
234 See id. (reporting that there is "nothing in the law which requires [you] to
name" your contacts); see also Lynda Richardson, AIDS Groups Stunned by Vote for
PartnerNotification, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, at B2 (reporting that AIDS advocates
argue that the law' will "...give the public a false impression that every partner would be
notified when, in fact, many infected people will either refuse to disclose names of
partners or make up names").
235 See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6.
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practically speaking, a person cannot be forced to give information
about their sexual and
needle-sharing partners if they are adamantly
236
SO.
doing
to
opposed
Added to the law's limitations is the frightening possibility
that the law will actually discourage people from voluntary testing,
providing contact information or receiving treatment.2 37 This fear is
supported by the fact that those most at risk for HIV infection racial minorities and gay men - are those who are most likely to be
suspicious of the government use of name reporting.2 38 Studies have
revealed that many people say they would be deterred from testing if
their names could be reported.2 39 Opponents of the law often state
that the success of STD control programs depend, in part, on the
240
voluntary cooperation of the patient in disease intervention.
Opponents further argue that "mandatory partner-notification [is]
counterproductive [by] eliciting false information about contacts and
24 1
discouraging seropositive drug-users from seeking treatment.
Supporters of the Partner Notification Law reject the theory
that partner notification will somehow force many who are HIV
positive to go "underground" and drive them out of the healthcare
system. 242 Assemblywoman Mayersohn is quoted as calling that
argument "nonsense," responding that "[p]eople are not going to run
away from treatment when they are sick. They are going to run
toward it."' 243 In fact, despite the studies that indicate name reporting
deters individuals from testing, there is limited evidence that this

236 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at

20.

237 See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6 (quoting the executive director of a
coalition of 200 community-based AIDS groups as saying that she believes the law will
"drive people out of the health system").
238 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36. (quoting Moises Agoste of the
National Minority AIDS Council as saying that there are still people in these communities
that believe that it was the government that created the AIDS epidemic).
239 See id.
240 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at 22.

241 See Bobbi Bernstein, Solving the Physicians Dilemma: An HIV PartnerNotification Plan, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 127, 132 (1995).
242 See Duggan, supra note 123, at A6.
243 Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

988

[Vol. XVI

would actually occur.244 The CDC has tracked testing in six states

and, with one exception, there were no large overall declines in the
number of individuals being tested after name reporting laws were
implemented.245
Supporters of partner notification also point to the factthat the
same "underground" argument was made before Mayersolii's "baby
AIDS" law mandated HIV testing for newborns 246 and there is no
indication that pregnant women are avoiding the healthcare system
at
since the law was passed.247 One study has shown that most people 248
high risk for HIV simply do not know if their state collects names.
If true, then the massive public resistance to the partner notification
law could have the unfortunately ironic effect of deterring people
from testing who would never have known the difference in the first
place. 249 The issue of whether partner notification will actually make
a difference in the rate with which people with HIV in New York are
tested and treated is one that it will take years of study to determine.25°
The one thing the law does is better enable public health
officials to keep track of the rate of HIV infection. 251 This "head
counting" function of the law is very important in an age when new
treatments are slowing the development of the actual disease of
AIDS.252 Tracking allows the public to know when new outbreaks
occur and better determine who is most at risk.253
244 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.

245 See id. (indicating that Michigan is the exception).
246 N.Y.PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 1998).

247 See Fernandez, supra note 90, at 1076.
248 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.
249 See id. Some AIDS activists are even starting to think that fighting name
reporting might be the wrong battle. Id. Schoofs quotes Cornelius Baker of the National
Association of People with AIDS as saying "I don't want people to believe that the
greatest threat to their privacy is the surveillance system, while at the same time we're
advocating for Medicaid which would put them on a list." Id.
250 See id. The study in New York similar to the CDC's would have to track
testing before and after name reporting. Id.
251 See id.
252 See id.

253 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36 (quoting the executive director of the
National Association of people with AIDS as saying that "[s]urveillance is a benefit in
itself'); see also Burr, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that "the most basic epidemiology holds

20001

THE NAME GAME

989

However, some argue that name reporting was not necessary
for effective surveillance and favor using a "unique identifier" that
preserves anonymity while providing enough information for an
accurate demographic count. 5 Two states, Maryland and Texas,
have-experimented with this system.2 55 The Texas system was found
to be a failure, but the success of the Maryland system is still being
determined.256 The director of Maryland's AIDS administration is
pleased with their unique identifier results but the CDC, which
tracked both systems, has concluded name reporting is the most
to provide HIV data and refuses to fund the Maryland
accurate25way
7
project.
CONCLUSION

Is the HIV Partner Notification Law an appropriate response
to the current state of the AIDS epidemic? The answer seems to be
both yes and no. As a method of accomplishing its stated goal,
warning sexual and needle-sharing partners of HIV-positive persons,
its effect will be fairly limited. The law primarily allows healthcare
workers, who know the names of their HIV-positive patients' past or
current sexual partners, a way of informing these partners with
impunity. 25 8 However, we did not need a new law to accomplish
this.259 Partner notification was a legal option before this law was
passed.26° It just was not utilized to its full potential.261 More funding
for health departments to effectively implement better voluntary
programs and an expressed elimination of criminal liability for
that early knowledge of where a virus is moving..
254 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.

is essential to slowing its spread").

255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See id.

258 See Richardson, supranote 234, at B2.
259
See infra Part I.C (discussing the circumstances under which partner
notification was permitted).
260 See id.

261 See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 7 (describing a small program that was
already in place in the New York City Department of Health).
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doctors who participate in these programs might have 262
been a more
efficient way of improving New York's notification rate.
The HIV Partner Notification Law is more successful as a
back door way of bringing name reporting to New York State. 263 The
law says that name reporting is being implemented for the purpose of
partner notification and the bill makes no mention of the use of reports
for HIV surveillance, although DOH will probably be able to use the
data to monitor the epidemic.264 As stated before, monitoring the rate
of HIV infection is particularly important because people are living
longer with the virus without contracting the disease. 265 If we simply
monitor AIDS cases we may get the false impression that the disease
266
has ceased to spread and miss new outbreaks in unexpected places.
Unique identifiers are unproven as an efficient tracking method and
since New York has one of the highest AIDS caseloads in the country
this is not the best place to test such a system.267
As long as the data is kept secure and strictly confidential,
name reporting should not pose a large threat to the privacy of those
who are HIV positive. Documented breaches of security in other
states are extremely rare given the amount of information that is
routinely handled.268 On the other hand, we should be fearful that the
state would someday decide to revoke the confidentiality of HIV
information. This is still a very real and possible threat. By
implementing name reporting the state is asking HIV positive people
to trust them with extremely personal and potentially devastating
information. 269 This is a "leap of faith" that many are not willing to
262 See Richardson, supra note 236, at B2 (reporting that advocates argue "it
would have been far better to promote voluntary partner notification rather than introduce
a system that will be counterproductive").
263 See S.4422-B, ch. 163, sec. 1, § 2130(1), 1998 N.Y. Laws 584 (codified at
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(1) (McKinney's Supp. 1999)) (creating a duty to report
HIV infection
and HIV related illness).
2 64
See GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, supra note 174.

265 See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.
266 See id.
267 See id.

268 See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 14, at 732.
269 See Fernandez, supranote 90, at 1056 (stating that people with AIDS "did
suffer from job discrimination, housing discrimination and loss of employment").
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make. 270 But now, for the time being, they must. Any attempts to
violate that trust should (and most likely will) be fought with
vehemence and passion.
SharronSalmon

270

See Schoofs, supra note 85, at 36.

